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Netherlands / CELSTEC) 
1. Definition and meaning of cognitive skills  
A physician who performs catheter-based cardiovascular interventions must master many 
diverse skills including social skills for interacting with patients, management skills for 
handling and coordinating diverse case scenarios, tactile and motor skills for operating the 
catheter, and many more. Although these skills are crucial, they are not the focus of this 
chapter (e.g., for psycho-motor skills see Chapter 8). Instead, cognitive skills required to plan 
and actually carry out interventions which play a crucial role in the overall performance of 
catheter-based cardiovascular interventions, are the focus.  
Psychology has a long tradition in investigating and training cognitive skills. Van Lehn (1) 
described cognitive skills as “the ability to solve problems in intellectual tasks, where success 
is determined more by subjects’ knowledge than by their physical prowess” (p. 513). To 
understand cognitive skills, it is important to understand the human cognitive architecture on 
which basis these skills depend. In this section we first discuss human cognitive architecture 
as a 3-storage model of sensory register, working memory, and long-term memory. Then, we 
discuss how cognitive skills operate in working memory in terms of perception and higher-
level cognitive skills.  
1.1 Human cognitive architecture in information processing 
1.1.1 Atkinson’s and Shiffrin’s 3-storage model 
Atkinson & Shiffrin (2, 3) describe human cognitive architecture in their information-
processing model. Figure 1 refers to structures and processes assumed by this model (this 
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figure includes also other structures and processes assumed by models described below). Its 
basis is a 3-storage-assumption which states that three separate memories exist, namely an 
almost unlimited but extremely transient sensory memory, an in capacity but also temporally 
limited working memory, and an unlimited long-term memory. To be successfully stored, 
information must pass all three memory structures, but the information processing differs in 
each structure.  
In a first step, input from the environment enters the sensory register which stores surface 
stimulus features of different nature in different sub-registers (e.g., visual, audio, haptic, 
olfactory, gustatory). The sensory register is able to store large amounts of information, but 
only for a fraction of a second. Most of the information gets lost after this very brief amount 
of time. Only information that is attended to in the sensory register is further processed. 
Hence, relevant information has to be actively selected to enter working memory. The 
selected information entities may be of different nature, such as words, image features, 
smells, or other. Next, the information selected by the attentional mechanism is transferred to 
working memory for further processing. Atkinson and Shiffrin assume that working memory 
is very limited in terms of capacity. That is, only a limited amount of information can be 
actively processed in working memory at the same time. Furthermore, information that is 
processed can be held in working memory for as long as it is processed and is then 
permanently stored in long term memory. Information that is not further processed (e.g., 
rehearsed, elaborated upon, etc.) deteriorates and is lost from working memory. The long 
term memory is a permanent storage for unlimited amounts of information. Atkinson and 
Shiffrin do not make specific assumptions on how exactly information is stored in long term 
memory. However, they assume that information cannot be stored in long term memory 
before it has passed through the other memory structures. Furthermore, they assume that 
information stored in long term memory can re-enter working memory. There it can be 
processed, changed, or integrated with new information already active in working memory. A 
last crucial assumption in their model concerns a possible output of these processes to the 
environment. In their model, higher level cognitive processes such as decision making take 
place in working memory. Hence, the outcome of a decision-making process depends on 
which information is currently active in working memory, which can be new input from the 
environment, old information received from long term memory, or a combination of both.  
It is important to note that the description of working and long term memory as two separate 
entities has been criticized [in terms of coding of information in working memory: (4); 
recency effect in long term memory: (5, 6); fewer limitations of working memory: (7)]. 
Current views see the two more as constructs that help in describing certain cognitive 
processes (e.g., active processing of information or its storage) instead of as two distinct 
memory structures. 
1.1.2 Sensory register and working memory: capacity limitations and temporal constraints 
The sensory register stores input from the environment in an unprocessed manner for a very 
brief amount of time. It is assumed that this part of memory can be divided into different 
stores that depend on the actual sense that encountered the input, such as smell, touch, vision, 
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hearing and taste (8). Most research focuses on the visual (iconic) and hearing (echoic) sub-
registers of sensory memory (9). Research on iconic memory has found that approximately 
10 icons can be held in the sensory register (10) for about 200-400 msec (11). One important 
purpose of iconic memory is to provide us with a stable impression of the visual world, while 
our eyes are ‘jumping’ across the environment (12). Likewise, the echoic memory has also 
been widely studied. The echoic sub-register is capable of storing fewer items (±5), but for 
longer periods of time (2-3 sec) compared to the iconic memory (13). Although other sub-
registers in sensory memory that may be important for medical diagnosis and intervention 
(e.g., tactile input) have hardly been investigated, we may assume that they function in a 
manner similar to iconic and echoic memory. That is, a complete afterimage of the sensation 
remains within the relevant memory storage for a brief time so that information can be 
selected from through attention. 
Two theories describe the components of working memory, namely the dual coding theory by 
Paivio (14) and the working memory theory by Baddeley (15). Both Paivio and Baddeley 
assume that two separate channels exist for information processing in the human cognitive 
system, namely a visual-pictorial and an auditory-verbal channel. These channels are 
distinguished according to sensory modalities, that is, information presented to the eyes is 
initially processed in the visual channel, while information presented to the ears is initially 
processed in the auditory channel. Information that entered these two channels is passed into 
the according component of working memory, namely either the phonological loop or the 
visuospatial sketchpad. The phonological loop stores and manipulates verbal information, 
while the visuospatial sketchpad does the same for visual information. Baddeley describes 
these two components as ‘slave systems’. Besides these slave systems, there is a superior 
component called central executive, which controls the attentional system and integrates 
information from both slave systems. Moreover, within this working memory structure new 
information is integrated with prior knowledge activated from long-term memory, for 
instance in forms of schemata (see following section).  
In addition to these assumptions about components of and processes occurring in working 
memory, research in cognitive psychology has also studied its storage size and duration. 
Initially, it was assumed that the working memory storage is limited to 7±2 entities and that 
this can be increased by chunking several information entities into one large entity (16). More 
recent findings suggest that this ‘magic number’ may not be as strict as initially assumed (7, 
17). Furthermore, working memory is also temporally restricted to around 18 sec (18) though 
some research has put it as low as 2 sec. and as high as 30 sec. As with the working memory 
size, we may assume that this exact number should be seen more as an approximation than a 
fixed setting.  
1.1.3 Long-term memory structures: schemata, scripts, and network models 
Many theories deal with the storage of knowledge in long-term memory, such as the network 
model (19), ACT* theory (20) and many more. This chapter will not go into these theories in 
depth, but will limit itself to schemata or scripts as forms of knowledge storage in long-term 
memory, because these are deemed to be especially relevant by researchers on medical 
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expertise (see Section 2). The concept of schemata was introduced by Bartlett (21). Van Lehn 
(22) describes schemata and their use in the following way: In an optimal situation, where the 
task performer has a high-level of expertise in a domain, she or he has already acquired many 
schemata. A schema consists of two components, namely information on the task or problem 
and information on its solution. Schemata are constructed in that all schema-relevant 
information is activated simultaneously in working memory. Schemata have two central 
functions. First, they are an efficient way to store and organize knowledge in long-term 
memory. Second, they reduce the load in working memory, in that they subsume several 
information entities into one (i.e., chunking) and thus, only occupy one entity of the 7±2 
available. Frequent schema activation results in schema automation, which means that a 
schema can be used very quickly while causing minimal load on working memory. Experts in 
domains like medical diagnosis store elaborate schemata in an efficient manner in long-term 
memory, so that they can be direct accessed in working memory by means of retrieval cues 
(23). 
1.2 Cognitive skills operating in working memory 
When prior knowledge is activated from long-term memory or when new information enters 
the human cognitive system, all interpretation and manipulation of this information takes 
place in working memory. Cognitive skills operating within the working memory system are 
either perceptual (i.e., when information enters from the environment) or higher order (i.e., 
when perceived information is further manipulated and prior knowledge is activated) as 
described in the following.  
Perception of information from an environmental input has two components, namely a 
bottom-up and a top-down component. The bottom-up component refers to influences from 
the environment itself. For instance, if a part of a grey stimulus is yellow, it is more visually 
salient and hence more likely to be perceived (24). The top-down component refers to 
influences from our previous knowledge or expectations. For instance, one person looks at 
the same painting differently with different tasks in mind (25), or people with different 
expertise levels look differently at the same painting (26). One important aspect of perception 
is attention, which refers to processes involved in the selection of elements within a stimulus 
for further processing while ignoring others (27). Allocation of visual attention is guided by 
both exogenous and endogenous cues; again top-down and bottom-up (28). Another 
important aspect of perception is pattern recognition; the ability to give meaning to a 
complex stimulus such as a street scene. Several theories on pattern recognition exist, all of 
which basically state that we compare what we perceive to a model or prototype that we have 
stored in our memory [e.g., (8, 29, 30)]. If this stored model sufficiently matches the 
perceived object, it is recognized as a certain pattern (e.g., a character, a face). This process 
occurs within a very short time and does not require higher levels of processing.  
Higher order cognitive skills include language production and understanding (not the focus of 
the current chapter), decision making (see Chapter XY this book), and problem solving. Van 
Lehn (22) describes schema-driven problem solving in the following manner: When 
executing a task or solving a problem based on schemata, three processes occur: (a) selecting 
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a schema from long-term memory and activating it in working memory, (b) adapting and 
instantiating it to the task at hand, and (c) executing the associated solution procedure. 
Selecting a schema is supposed to happen very early in the task performance process. Once a 
schema is activated, it affects or guides the further processing of the task. Usually, a general 
schema is activated first, guiding the activation of more specific schemata. In a next step, the 
schema is instantiated, that is, it is adapted to the task at hand. It is important to note here that 
Van Lehn describes a schema as a structure that consists of givens and demands, so-called 
slots. When adapting a schema to a specific task, these slots are filled with task-specific 
information. This process often goes hand in hand with choosing a more specific schema. 
Finally, the solution procedure that is part of the schema is executed step by step (for routine 
tasks at least). This part, however, is not always trivial. Often, the solution procedure consists 
of sub-problems that also have to be solved. 
1.4 Nomenclature and summary of cognitive skills 
Figure 1 presents a summarized model of human cognitive architecture as it is assumed by 
the described theories. Central terms and processes re-occurred in those theories. The most 
important are: 
Sensory memory: A pre-cognitive system that is unlimited in capacity, but very 
limited in time. Information is only processed further in the human cognitive system if 
attended to (i.e., selected). 
Working memory: A central system where all active mental processes occur which is 
limited in both time and capacity. Here, new information is organized and integrated 
in schemata activated from long-term memory. The schemata are then further adapted 
and instantiated resulting in the execution of the solution procedure attached to the 
schema. Note that these cognitive skills can only operate if working memory capacity 
is not exceeded. 
Long-term memory: Where knowledge is stored and optimally organized in 
schemata. 
Perception: The first step of conscious information processing. It requires attention to 
certain elements within a stimulus and allows for pattern recognition within this 
stimulus. 
Higher order cognitive skills: An elaborate and further processing of perceived 
information, its integration with prior knowledge, and its further manipulation. These 
skills compose language understanding and production, decision making, and problem 
solving. 
Schema: How knowledge is organized and stored in long-term memory. When 
activated in working memory, schemata reduce working memory load. Schemata 
consist of givens and slots that need to be filled with context information and solution 
procedures.  
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Figure 1. Summary of principles of the human cognitive architecture. 
2. Cognitive skills as they apply to medicine 
The previous section reviewed the concept of cognitive skills. This section discusses how 
these concepts apply to the medical domain. The role of cognitive skills in medicine has been 
an important research topic for the past 30 years (for an overview on research history on 
cognitive skills in medicine see (31), Chapter 1). This topic was investigated from two 
perspectives which were not incorporated up until now. First, research on the development of 
knowledge structures in long-term memory across expertise levels and its influence on 
higher-level cognitive processes such as clinical reasoning is almost exclusively based on the 
analysis of written medical records without taking into account that clinical practice often 
requires using and thus perceiving medical images [e.g., (32-36)]. Second, findings on the 
perception of medical images were not related to higher-level working memory processes or 
long-term memory [e.g., (37-39)]. This section begins by describing research on the 
development of long-term memory structures and then higher-level working memory 
processes. Next, it describes what is known about the perception of medical images. In a last 
step, it makes a first attempt to bring the findings from both research perspectives together in 
one model.  
2.1 Storage and organization of medical knowledge in long-term memory throughout 
expertise development 
The storage and recall of knowledge in long-term memory is critically important for the 
development of cognitive skills. Research in cognitive psychology has suggested that 
knowledge is optimally stored in forms of schemata (1, 22). The nature and development of 
schemata across expertise levels can be described in greater detail for the medical domain, 
where a 3-stage model describing changes in knowledge organization with increasing 
expertise has been proposed [e.g., (32-36)].  
The first stage describes the knowledge organization of novices such as interventional 
fellows. These novices acquire large amounts of knowledge from basic sciences, including 
vascular anatomy, pathophysiology of the human cardiovascular system and pharmacology. 
This knowledge is often referred to as biomedical knowledge. The amount of knowledge 
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novices need to acquire is considerable and proper reasoning with such large amounts of 
knowledge can be difficult, particularly when it is organized in a way that does not fit the task 
at hand which is customary in the daily medical practice. Knowledge networks that link 
concepts studied provide an important starting point at this stage. These networks are 
composed of nodes that represent concepts which may be of different order levels [cf. the 
idea of general and specific schemata presented by Van Lehn (22)]. Higher order concepts 
describe diseases more generally (e.g., heart failure). These higher order concepts contain 
lower-order concepts, such as specifications of the higher concept (here: diastolic failure, 
systolic failure, type and functional stage of the primary cardiac disease) and symptoms and 
signs related to this disease or phenomenon (here: fatigue, dyspnea, thoracic X-ray 
congestion of lungs, echocardiography findings and other). These concepts are interconnected 
via links that symbolize hierarchical order or double relations of certain concepts. For 
instance, tachycardia may be related to the progression of heart failure, side-effects of 
medication, anxiety or other factors. The network system of high complexity level has to be 
built over a long time and may take years to develop by improving and adding new concepts 
to the existing network and establishing new connecting links. The aim of teaching and 
learning at this stage is to augment and validate these knowledge networks. At the end of this 
stage, the trainee should be able to make direct lines of reasoning between different concepts 
within the networks that are based on sound pathophysiological and clinical principles.  
When the trainee has acquired a sufficient number of knowledge networks, he/she may begin 
to apply his knowledge in clinical encounters with real patients. The main task of this second 
stage consists of fine-tuning the existing networks. By using the acquired knowledge in 
practice, the novice activates concepts and links between those concepts confirming or 
disproving their validity. Frequent activation of specific connections serves the development 
of basic routines based on recall of automated links. This successive automation entails 
clustering concepts within one line of reasoning together, such that intermediate concepts can 
be skipped and only the starting and ending concepts remain. For instance, in the condition of 
liver cirrhosis you may encounter in the anatomy of a patient the following: hepatitis, cell 
destruction, nodular regeneration, increased pressure on supplying veins, portal hypertention, 
ascites, extended abdomen, esophagus varices, hemorrhage, etc. The line of reasoning can be 
abbreviated to hepatitis can lead eventually to portal hypertention and esophagus varices. 
These clusters are summoned under semi clinical terms, like portal hypertension. These 
summary terms, in turn, serve as tools for reasoning. This process is called knowledge 
encapsulation (32, 34, 35), a phenomenon that has been extensively investigated and verified 
in the medical domain [e.g., (40-43)]. In sum, at this stage of expertise, the theoretical 
knowledge of cardiovascular diseases becomes integrated by means of encapsulation into 
practical clinical knowledge of manifestations of real diseases in actual patients. In catheter-
based cardiovascular interventions, additional knowledge translating disease concepts into 
interventional strategies and the conduct of actual interventions must be acquired along with 
general knowledge of cardiovascular diseases. This type of knowledge is formed primarily by 
learning about the biomechanical properties of the cardiovascular system and the 
interventional instrumentation and their mutual interactions during the interventional process 
(i.e., during clinical practice).  
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When a physician or operator has extensive clinical experience and has become an expert in 
her/his domain, one speaks of the third stage of knowledge organization in expertise 
development. At this stage, expert knowledge is organized in an entirely different qualitative 
way, namely in so-called illness scripts (44). Based on illness scripts, the knowledge about 
diseases becomes stored in three components. The first component specifies general 
conditions that enable or constrain a disease including contextual (i.e., social, hereditary, and 
environmental) information. The second component contains the assessed pathophysiological 
process of the actual specific disease, such as the stage and degree of organ dysfunction in an 
individual patient. This knowledge is again encapsulated (i.e., as in Stage 2, lines of 
reasoning are often reduced to a few semi-clinical terms). The third component spans the 
subjective and objective symptoms and signs of the disease as present in an individual 
patient. In catheter-based cardiovascular interventions, the expert knowledge also comprises 
knowledge on interventions within the illness-scripts. It is important to note that this kind of 
organization is structured in a less causal, but more temporal manner in contrast to the 
network-structure common in Stage 2. Here knowledge is organized based on operational 
clusters and temporal patterns allowing speedy and highly efficient processing. Moreover, the 
amount of clustering and complexity of the knowledge structures is substantially higher, 
more focused and better targeted than in the second stage. 
2.2 Higher-level working memory processes – Clinical reasoning 
Section 1 discussed how higher-level working memory processes include the activation of 
schemata from long-term memory, instantiation of these schemata with context information 
from the task at hand, and ending with an execution of the schemata-related procedural 
solutions. Boshuizen and Schmidt (33) formulated these processes (here: clinical reasoning) 
in greater detail for the medical domain. When a cardiovascular specialist is confronted with 
a patient case, she/he immediately activates one or more illness scripts. Which scripts are 
activated depends on the given enabling conditions and the observed consequences. For 
example, if an acutely ill drug-user exhibits shaking chills, high heart rate, murmurs, and 
petechiae then the illness script “Acute Bacterial Endocarditis” would probably be activated. 
Once the script is activated, it is not necessary to spend additional mental resources to 
actively search through all of the available diagnostic options associated with each of the 
signs/symptoms including their relevant decision-trees. After the script has been activated, it 
is instantiated with case-specific information to match the script with the case-specific data of 
the individual patient. Moreover, expectations concerning the likely course of the disease are 
generated. In the course of this script instantiation, the expectations given by the script are 
updated or replaced by data from the actual patient. Some scripts automatically activate look-
alikes or imitators of a certain disease that always have to be considered in a differential 
diagnosis. If the selected script fails, it is disabled and an alternative script is initiated. A 
successfully instantiated script triggers the disease management process including diagnostic 
work-up and treatment schedule. It is important to note that this process is more or less 
automated and thus, remains largely subconscious. In the case that no activated script 
matches the given patient scenario, the expert must fall back on active clinical reasoning 
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based on biomedical and clinical knowledge. This process is much more time consuming, 
laborious and substantially more prone to errors.  
Clinical workplaces differ in the rhythm at which information gathering, reasoning and action 
take place. It is an issue brought up by Eraut (45). Catheter-based cardiovascular 
interventions, for example, require that clinical reasoning takes place to a large extent during 
a data gathering process. Little research has been done on this form of clinical scenario. An 
exception here is the research carried out by Wagenaar (46) who used video-stimulated recall 
(47) to compare cognitive processes of mental health care professionals with different level 
of expertise while conducting an in-hospital admission interview. The study showed that less 
experienced mental health care professionals focused mostly on one thing at a time and tried 
to collect as much data as possible to think about later. With increasing expertise, the mental 
health care professionals “thought on their feet”; that is, they specifically asked for the 
information needed to verify of falsify the hypotheses at hand to support or discard the 
currently activated illness-scripts. At the same time they monitored other aspects of the 
interview such as time management, relation with the patient, etc. In catheter-based 
cardiovascular interventions, the patient’s data comes mostly from directly acting on the 
patient under time constrains and risks. Therefore, the ability of the expert to gather the data 
needed to verify or falsify hypotheses and generate new ones and to form and execute 
interventional strategies on the fly is substantially more crucial than in the Wagenaar study. 
The operator must first activate any pertinent illness-scripts before carrying out the 
intervention. While carrying out the intervention, she/he must quickly fill in the slots of the 
most likely script, generate expectations about intended outcomes and match all with the 
actual outcomes. If the patient data do not match an activated script, this script has to be 
either quickly adapted or discarded. Successful execution of this highly complex cognitive 
process requires a combination of a critical amount of knowledge, accurate and efficient 
information processing, sustained attention, rapid decision making based on correct 
judgments, and skilled execution of intended interventional actions. 
2.3 Perceptual processes in working memory 
Many diagnostic tasks require the processing and interpretation of complex, visual input 
thereby posing strong demands on perception [i.e., perceptual tasks, cf. (48, 49)]. This is also 
the case for catheter-based cardiovascular interventions. When the operator cognitively 
instantiates the disease schema and strategy of treatment, she/he must know where to look for 
key abnormalities and interpret findings. Therefore, reading and interpreting X-ray images or 
CT scans in real-time are critical parts of the interventional process. Hence, an important 
aspect of cognitive interventional skills is of a perceptual nature comprising the ability to (a) 
perceive relevant information from a stream of irrelevant data and (b) interpret it correctly.  
These perceptual processes as they apply to medical imaging are usually investigated by 
means of eye movement tracking, a method to measure direction, length and order of 
person’s gazes (50). Extensive research data has shown that experts possess far more 
sophisticated perceptual skills than novices. Experts identify relevant parts within the image 
faster and study these parts longer [e.g., (37-39, 51)]. This research has focused at the visual 
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selection and interpretation of abnormalities in medical images. Higher-level cognitive 
processes such as image interpretation within the context of other patient symptoms, signs or 
medical findings have scarcely been investigated with the exception of the classical research 
carried out by Lesgold and colleagues (52) who investigated the cognitive interpretation of 
static X-ray images of the chest performed experts and novices. The main findings were: 
1. Experts diagnose X-ray images in three steps: (a) a mental representation of the 
visualized anatomy is formed, (b) findings are quickly matched with an appropriate 
schema1
2. Less experienced individuals experience difficulties in that they (a) cannot find 
appropriate schema, (b) either do not test schema for applicability or do not draw 
appropriate consequences if a schema fails to stand the test, or (c) miss important 
details of the diagnosis. 
 to formulate the diagnosis, and (c) means to confirm the diagnosis are 
defined or in case of incongruence the schema is discarded. 
3. Expertise development in reading X-rays is not a monotonic process. In several cases 
residents performed worse than beginners. 
 
Similar processes are likely operative in catheter-based cardiovascular interventions. An 
important difference between the cognitive task studied thus far and the settings of catheter-
interventions, however, is the dynamic character of data flow contained in X-ray images or 
CT scans (e.g., cine sequences) in coronary angiography with 30 images/second. Rapid 
sequences of images and their continuous changes with different projections and/or following 
interventional actions imposes significantly greater perceptual challenges on the operator 
compared to reading static X-ray images in the quiet of the reading suite. At present, little is 
known about the perceptual skills required to read complex and dynamic medical images. In 
a recent study (53) experts, residents, and novices were compared in their ability to formulate 
medical diagnoses based on a specific type of dynamic images, namely the observation of 
video cases of infant patients that were suspected of suffering from epileptic seizures. Results 
showed that with growing expertise, individuals identified relevant target areas more reliably, 
scrutinized these areas in greater detail and were not so easily distracted by the remainder of 
the video. In terms of cognitive interpretation of the medical image, individuals with greater 
expertise explored less data, but generated and evaluated more hypotheses. As perceptual 
skills were not the primary focus of this study, no more detailed analyses on the nature and 
development of perceptual processes were conducted. In another domain – classification of 
biological motion patterns – only one study, investigated perceptual skills while interpreting 
dynamic images (54). This study showed that experts attend longer to relevant areas, whereas 
novices are more often distracted by irrelevant areas. Moreover, experts use knowledge- and 
experience-based heuristics in performing the task (as show in cognitive and visual 
processes).  
Based on the structure of the interventional process, it can be assumed that expert interveners 
will also employ sophisticated perceptual skills enabling them to quickly identify important 
characteristics of individual cases, focus on key abnormalities of the target sites and interpret 
                                                          
1 In terminology of Boshuizen and Schmidt, the schema would be called “illness-script”. 
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observed abnormalities by matching them to stored illness-scripts. The matching process 
between the actual case and stored illness-script will also probably use procedural based 
heuristics – reflected at both the cognitive and the perceptual level. It is likely that experts 
employ individually different perceptual strategies throughout their professionalization. 
2.4 Summary model of cognitive skills in medicine 
For the medical domain, comparable assumptions about cognitive processes as described in 
Section 1 exist, but the assumptions are more specific (Figure 2). First, we start off with a 
stimulus that may be olfactory (e.g., breath and/or body odor), auditory (e.g., what that the 
patient says during examination), tactile (e.g., resistance felt during an examination of the 
vessels), proprioceptive (e.g., muscle tension in the right arm) or visual (e.g., a chest X-ray). 
All these constantly streaming stimuli contain information relevant for diagnosis and 
intervention, though much of this information is irrelevant. Second, all this information from 
the outer-world remains active in sensory memory for a very short time depending on to 
which information attention is paid. The challenge for a physician is to attend quickly and 
constantly to relevant incoming information and ignore irrelevant information. Third, through 
this process of actively attending to information, this information is perceived and enters 
working memory. From this step onwards, one can speak of cognitive processes. In this step, 
relevant information is searched for and selected (which is an interactive process with the 
sensory system) and then interpreted. Fourth, the interpreted information is further processed 
in working-memory on a higher level. These higher-level processes are composed of three 
sub-processes. First, the information is organized into a mental model of the patient’s 
anatomy. In the second sub-process, clinical reasoning begins in which an illness-schema is 
activated, instantiated, tested, and if necessary adapted or rejected. The final sub-process 
involves decision making based on all the so-far mentioned processes. Fifth, the decision 
about a diagnosis and an interventional procedure are the output of the above described 
cognitive processes. Sixth, and finally, all biomedical and clinical knowledge is stored in 
long-term memory. Here the knowledge on diseases is organized and stored in illness-scripts 
and can be activated if needed for clinical reasoning in the working memory. 
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Figure 2. Summary of cognitive skills operating in medical diagnosis. 
3. How exploring cognitive skills can improve professional performance in 
medicine 
The previous section outlined the processes taking place and the cognitive skills that lie at the 
basis of expertise in catheter-based cardiovascular interventions. This section looks at the 
conclusions that may be drawn from these insights with respect to teaching and improving the 
acquisition of cognitive skills for carrying out medical tasks. It also reviews the first attempts 
being made to teach perceptual skills in medicine. 
3.1 Acquisition of cognitive skills in medicine 
As stated, catheter-based cardiovascular interventions require complex, high-level cognitive 
skills. These skills are based on two pillars, namely extensive biomedical knowledge and 
substantial clinical practice. Novice medical students must acquire a large body of biomedical 
knowledge and organize it in an efficient manner such that they will be able to retrieve it 
when the need arises. Intermediates who have already obtained the prerequisite biomedical 
knowledge need to apply and test this knowledge in clinical settings so as to obtain a certain 
degree of expertise in medicine. Furthermore, due to the rapid developments in medicine, 
medical knowledge and medical technology, medical expertise rapidly becomes dated and 
thus requires constant updating. Hence, to maintain a high level of expertise, physicians have 
to engage in lifelong learning; in interventional medicine, deliberate practice appears to be 
the most efficient means to both develop and maintain expertise. This section reflects upon 
the organization of learning in the domain of catheter-based cardiovascular interventions with 
increasing expertise. 
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3.1.1 Learning in the beginning: Novice students must acquire large amounts of biomedical 
knowledge 
At the beginning of a study in medicine, trainees must acquire knowledge of all relevant 
aspects of the human body and learn this by heart. This biomedical knowledge contains 
information about the anatomy, the function and the malfunction of human body. Trainees 
must achieve to mastery level two main goals in this stage, namely the acquisition of a vast 
amount of knowledge and the efficient organization of this knowledge. For instance, trainees 
need to know the anatomy and function of the heart and the entire cardiovascular system. 
They also need to know about pathophysiology and the management of specific 
cardiovascular diseases and disorders. Norman, Eva, Brooks, and Hamstra (55) warned that 
some research results may have misrepresented the importance of biomedical knowledge in 
high-level medical expertise. For instance, Patel and Groen (56) reported that - based on 
thinking-aloud protocols - experts made less use of biomedical knowledge than residents. 
Does this mean that experts do not make use of biomedical knowledge? Schmidt and 
Boshuizen (34) revealed what happens to this ‘missing’ biomedical knowledge. They found 
that the reason for this apparently limited use of biomedical knowledge by experts is that the 
knowledge of these experts is encapsulated; it is present, but numerous information entities 
are clustered into one large entity. The fact that this knowledge is still present becomes 
evident when it becomes necessary to unfolded this encapsulated knowledge (57), for 
instance, when encountering a difficult patient case (58). Hence, acquisition of biomedical 
knowledge forms the basis for all medical expertise; lack of that knowledge leads to errors 
and misconceptions (59).  
A possible instructional approach for acquiring and encapsulating biomedical knowledge is 
through the use of example-based learning [for a current review on this topic see (60)]. 
Research on example-based learning has found that it is more efficient and effective to learn 
from skilled experts than by discovering how to carry out a task on one’s own. The greater 
efficiency of example-based learning is based on the fact that novices do not need to spend 
their cognitive resources searching for a solution or partial solution, continually comparing 
what they have found with the goal and readjusting their intermediate goals (weak problem 
solving method), but instead can devote all of their available cognitive capacities to learning 
the correct solutions and the path to such a solution. This assumption is often translated into 
learning from worked-out examples or from teaching cases. Worked-out examples are 
composed of a problem formulation, a solution, and the procedure to solve the problem in a 
step-wise manner (61-64). In this way, worked-out examples help the learner to build 
schemata. It is important to note that worked-out examples are particularly suited for the 
initial phase of skill acquisition and expertise development. However, this is only true, if 
worked-out examples are presented for those tasks that are very familiar to the experienced 
learner. If a new topic is introduced, worked examples can also support skill acquisition at 
higher levels of expertise (65). Van Merriënboer and Kirschner (66) noted that similar very 
effective technique is the use of modeling examples. Modeling examples provide maximum 
guidance to the learner – necessary when first acquiring a complex skill – “because they 
confront learners with professionals performing the complex task, simultaneously explaining 
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why the task is being performed the way it is. A modeling example is, thus, similar to a case 
study that needs to be studied and evaluated by the learner, but which also pays explicit 
attention to the processes needed to reach an acceptable solution” (p. 50). In cases of extreme 
complexity, they propose their 4-Component Instructional Design model proposes beginning 
with simplified whole tasks with maximal guidance. In medicine, the high degree of 
complexity of working with real patients can require the adjustment of teaching cases to the 
knowledge level of the trainees (33). These authors have shown that it is better to present a 
reduced amount of complexity when providing novices with clinical examples (e.g., paper 
cases, simulated patients) than real, complex cases. As students have to execute the entire line 
of reasoning, the information that is presented, though simplified, should be both complete 
and relevant. If this is not the case, students may be overwhelmed and can easily overlook 
information when they do not know it is relevant. As described previously in this chapter, this 
is particularly true for perceptual medical tasks (53). 
Norman et al. (55) state, however, that the implementation of clinical examples and teaching 
cases into medical curriculums has, thus far, been limited. Though research on example-
based learning in medicine may be in its beginnings, as pedagogical approach it has a long 
tradition in instructional design research and, thus, the question as to what to consider when 
designing example-based curriculums has been widely investigated. Atkinson et al. (61), for 
example, provide an overview on how to implement examples in a curriculum (so-called 
inter-example features). In their summary of the literature on this topic, they conclude with 
four instructional guidelines for such curriculums. First, it is beneficial to provide several 
examples instead of only one (cf. the claim by Norman et al. (55) on the importance of 
examples). Second, providing different problem types in worked-out examples aids learning. 
Third, one problem type should be represented by several examples with varying surface 
features (i.e., task irrelevant) to demonstrate the variability of its appearances. Fourth, and 
finally, after presenting an example, students should receive a comparable case to solve on 
their own.  
3.1.2 Learning to apply knowledge: Residents become experts through clinical practice 
As described in the previous section, the foundation of medical expertise is solid and sound 
biomedical knowledge. However, it has been clearly demonstrated that it is not the simply the 
amount of knowledge that makes up expertise [e.g., intermediates consistently recall more 
information than novices and experts; (35)]. In addition to the amount, the organization of 
knowledge is the other key to expert performance in all fields, and especially in medicine. In 
line with this reasoning, Eva, Norman, Neville, Wood, and Brooks (67) describe medical 
expertise as synthesizing all the details into a brief but coherent problem formulation and 
ignoring extraneous details. Thus, along with the acquisition of knowledge, the organization 
and synthesis of the acquired knowledge should also be in focus of medical curriculums. This 
can be achieved through exposing learners to clinical practice [i.e., for gaining clinical 
knowledge; (36, 55)]. Many researchers nowadays emphasize the importance of clinical 
practice and its interrelation with biomedical knowledge [e.g., (33, 55)]. 
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As is the case for novice learning, example-based learning and exposure to clinical practice 
plays a crucial role in the learning of intermediates (55). It is important that medical residents 
be exposed to as many as possible examples in practice to allow them to structure and 
organize their knowledge and finally achieve automated retrieval of relevant information 
[e.g., (68, 69)]. Exposure to examples, however, may also trigger diagnostic errors. It has, for 
example, been demonstrated that in teaching residents to interpret ECGs, they may become 
biased in their interpretations by a case that they have read prior to the current case causing 
erroneous diagnosis (70). It is crucial that residents at this stage of expertise development 
consciously review every single patient case they encounter to avoid diagnostic errors. In 
fact, research has shown that this ‘availability bias’ can be counteracted by having residents 
review and reflect upon their diagnostic decisions (71). Nevertheless, Norman et al. (55) 
conclude that in medicine “it takes many examples, and not just formal knowledge, to 
become an expert” (p. 345) – a view that is in line with many other researchers that typically 
do not investigate expertise development in the medical domain [e.g., (61, 72)]. A problem 
particular to residents is that they learn within a specific workplace. Hence, they often only 
encounter specific types of cases in their clinical practice. Providing residents with patient 
case examples, for instance by means of patient video cases, may counteract this unbalanced 
experience.  
For efficient transfer of medical knowledge, the design of the teaching cases and clinical 
examples is critical. Boshuizen and Schmidt (33) suggest – in accordance with the 4C/ID 
model (66) adapting the degree of complexity of examples to the expertise level of the 
learners. In other words, residents should be exposed to and should learn from more elaborate 
patient cases than novices. More complex cases should entail a greater number of interacting 
elements (i.e., should be more complex) and should have a higher degree of uncertainty 
concerning the completeness and relevance of provided information (e.g., should be more ill-
structured / open ended). Actual interactions with real patients provide the ultimate test for 
the usefulness of theoretical concepts and procedures acquired from lectures and textbooks. 
Each confirmation of theory in clinical practice leads to encapsulations of biomedical 
knowledge into higher level cognitive concepts (34).  
3.1.3 Keeping expertise up-to-date: Lifelong learning in medicine through deliberate practice 
Once the students have reached professional levels of expertise in their fields, one should not 
assume that their learning processes have been completed. There are at least two reasons for 
this. First, research has shown that with increasing years of experience that diagnostic 
accuracy declines (73-75). Second, expertise is ‘dynamic’ in the field of medicine (55); 
medicine is a field in which knowledge, techniques, medicines and tools are constantly either 
being updated or are changing. To counter this decline and to keep up with progress in 
medical knowledge, techniques and technologies, medical practitioners must learn to 
maintain and even broaden their expertise.  
As experts, practitioners possess high-level skills and considerable amounts of knowledge. 
Consequently, it is difficult to find instances where an expert can learn to further improve 
her/his professional skills. An instructional approach to increase expertise can be found in 
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deliberate practice (72) which is a form of training of highly specific cognitive or psycho-
motor skills required to master complex tasks. This approach was initially introduced to train 
exceptional performance in musicians and athletes, but can easily be transferred to medicine. 
Implementing this approach to catheter-based cardiovascular interventions requires expert 
professionals to generate mental models of how interventions should be optimally performed 
(i.e., master strategies), actually perform them, fully document the interventions as designed, 
and review and critically analyze the outcome of cases. During this process, the intervener 
should look out for mistakes / errors and seek / think of options for improvement. If possible, 
sub-tasks identified as problematic by case review and analysis should be practiced 
afterwards. In this way even highly skilled interveners can further improve their diagnostic 
and interventional skills. 
3.2 Training of perceptual skills via eye movement modeling examples 
Clinical knowledge based on the actual experience with real patients also involves perceptual 
skills. In both, research and clinical education, the development of perceptual skills has been 
largely neglected. Rather than conveying perceptual skills directly, they are often paraphrased 
in written text and accompanied by static pictures. Research data show that this approach is 
associated with suboptimal results [e.g., (76)]. An effective approach would provide 
perceptual experience in real-life settings. Accordingly, the use of patient video cases is 
becoming increasingly common [PVCs; cf. (77)]. Compared to traditional written of patient 
case descriptions, using PVCs for educational purposes has been shown to significantly 
improve diagnostic processes in medical students (76, 78, 79).  
These studies, however, did not focus on individual learning benefits, but rather on 
improvement of collaboration. Improving individual learning outcomes is crucial, as 
suggested by studies demonstrating critical perceptual problems of novices based on PVCs 
(53). These results have corroborated the learning outcome based on static, abstract medical 
images (e.g., (37-39, 51, 52)] and realistic photographs of patients (80). Hence, when dealing 
with complex perceptual medical tasks such as catheter-based cardiovascular interventions, 
novices must be helped to acquire perceptual skills by employing realistic instructional 
materials such as fully documented authentic clinical teaching cases.  
The efficiency of learning from these materials can be enhanced by a number of techniques. 
One very promising technique is that of eye movement modeling examples [EMME; cf. (81-
83)]. EMME are video examples that are accompanied by verbal, pedagogically modeled 
explanations – often given by the expert - for carrying out a task (i.e., it contains both what is 
done and why it was done). This explanation is augmented such that during the explanations, 
the gaze focus of this expert model is superimposed onto the video. EMME are based on the 
assumption that it is more efficient, effective, and motivating to learn from skilled 
professionals as opposed to learning on one’s own [cf. example-based learning: (63); or 
cognitive modeling alone: (84)]. Teaching cases are ‘worked-out’ (i.e., each step required to 
execute the task is presented to the learner).  
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To learn from examples, it is crucial to attend to the relevant features of the examples at the 
right time (85). An important possibility to guide students’ attention is by means of cueing 
[(86); also called signaling: (87)]. For instance, De Koning and colleagues - in a series of 
experiments – investigated the effectiveness of cueing when learning the functioning of the 
cardiovascular system from animations. In a first study (88) he and his colleagues compared a 
group of students learning from an animation where one subsystem of the cardiovascular 
system – the heart valves – was cued to a group learning from an non-cued animation. 
Results showed that learning from a cued animation helped understanding not only the cued, 
but also the non-cued parts of the cardiovascular system in contrast to learning from a non-
cued animation. In two further studies, however, the authors were unable to replicate this 
effect [(89, 90); for a review: (91)]. One problem may lie in the fact that often it is not clear 
where researchers – all of whom were not medical practitioners - place cues; that is, it is 
likely that researchers have either highlighted features based on what they thought would be 
important to focus on for novices. This, however, may not be the appropriate way to do it. 
Rather, it may be better to set cues based on empirical evidence. One successful way to set 
cues was presented by Grant and Spivey (92) who confronted participants with Duncker’s 
radiation problem in which a tumor needs to be destroyed without harming the surrounding 
healthy tissue. This problem was accompanied by an abstract drawing of the problem (see 
Figure 2). Participants, who solved the problem correctly – the laser needs to be split into two 
rays that cross on the tumor – looked significantly more at the skin area (as indicated by 
means of eye tracking) than participants who could not solve the problem. Based on this, the 
authors conducted a follow-up experiment where either (a) this skin area was highlighted, (b) 
an irrelevant area was highlighted, or (c) nothing was highlighted. This experiment showed 
that participants seeing the drawing with the skin area highlighted solved the problem 
significantly more often than participants from the other two conditions. Hence, designing 
cues based on eye movements of successful task performers appears to facilitate problem 
solving. 
 
Figure 2. Duncker’s radiation problem as used to investigate cueing. From Eye 
movements and problem solving: Guiding attention guides thought, by E. R. Grant & M. 
J. Spivey, 2003, Psychological Science, 14, 462-466 (Published with kind permission of 
© SAGE publications, 2003). 
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Note that the image used by Grant and Spivey (92) was very abstract and by no means 
resembles medical images used in clinical practice in terms of perceptual complexity. 
Litchfield, Ball, Donovan, Manning, and Crawford (93) used a similar method for a 
perceptually more complex task, to improving nodule detection in X-rays. They presented 
chest X-rays with superimposed eye movement patterns of radiologists searching for nodules 
(Figure 3). Results show that novice radiologists profit from this type of cueing based on eye 
movements in that they find nodules in these images more often. 
 
Figure 3. Cueing based on eye movements directly on chest X-rays. From Viewing 
another person’s eye movements improves identification of pulmonary nodules in chest X-
ray inspection, by D. Litchfield, L. J. Ball, T. Donovan, D. J. Manning, & T. Crawford, 
2011, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 16(3), 251–262. 
The medical image studied by Litchfield and colleagues (93) still does not fully resemble the 
perceptual situation encountered by physicians who perform catheter-based cardiovascular 
interventions, because the images used in the study were static and the clinical context of 
interventional suites was missing; efficient navigation through dynamic images under 
pressure and time constrains are far more difficult compared to image reviews in radiological 
reading rooms. Moreover, both studies just presented only investigated improvement of the 
task at hand. They did not investigate whether this ability could be carried over (i.e., 
transferred) to other examples.  
In sum, we have learned that the task of performing catheter-based cardiovascular 
interventions includes a large perceptual part. Moreover, we have learned – given on existing 
literature – that novices are very likely to lack these skills. As we have seen in this section, to 
study these skills it is crucial to guide students’ attention. This attention guidance, however, 
should not be based on what the instructional designer thinks is important, but rather on 
where successful task performers actually look at. A recent instructional method that 
successfully makes use of this type of instruction are EMME. In that, students learn by means 
of videos of actual patient cases that are verbally explained by an expert model. In addition, 
the attention focus of the expert guides the students’ attention to the right spot at the right 
time. This approach could also be used to teach perceptual skills required to execute catheter-
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based cardiovascular interventions. Video recordings of different interventions could be 
verbally explained by an expert cardiologist, who explains why s/he took which steps. 
Moreover, a visual cue based on this expert’s eye movements should be superimposed on 
these videos to guide the students’ attention. 
4. Summary and conclusions 
This chapter highlights the importance of cognitive training and skill development in carrying 
out complex tasking including medical reasoning and decision making applicable to catheter-
based cardiovascular interventions. The first part discussed cognitive skills from a cognitive 
psychology perspective. To understand the nature of cognitive skills, their foundation in 
human cognitive architecture was introduced as a 3-storage model. This model includes the 
sensory register, working memory, and long-term memory. Moreover, the operation of 
cognitive skills in working memory in terms of perception and higher-level cognitive 
processes was discussed. Based on this, in the second part of the chapter, theories of 
cognitive skills in medical expertise were introduced. These theories make more precise 
predictions as they all refer to the specific task of medical diagnosis. It is important to note, 
however, that although the cognitive structure and cognitive skills required for medical 
diagnosis are already well described, assumptions on their perceptual counterparts remain 
vague. Hence, future research should integrate existing theories on purely cognitive aspects 
of medical expertise with research on medical image perception. This is in particular true for 
dynamic medical images, like CT scans. Moreover, future research should be directed 
towards the analysis of cognitive skills required for mastery of cardiovascular interventional 
treatments. In sum, insight into cognitive skills is very important to address problems at a 
perceptual and higher cognitive level. For teaching, however, you need insight in all levels of 
skills required for medical diagnosis and interventions, like perceptual, cognitive, social, 
motors, etc. 
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